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ABSTRACT
Countries face a constant need to expand their electricity generation capacities. Electricity sources in a country 
and  the  respective  generation  technologies  have  different  technical,  economic,  environmental,  social  and 
political  characteristics.  The evaluation criteria of the generating sources and their technologies must not be 
restricted to the supply of the increased demand at the lowest cost. Compliance with other public policies must 
be considered in the decision process of the expansion, for instance, maximize local acquisition and minimize 
foreign fuel purchase. Countries have different energy resources, as well as different levels of technology and 
development in their industrial  parks.  Brazil  has many mineral  reserves,  besides the hydraulic  potential,  for 
supporting the expansion. The decision process in this sector, which includes nuclear energy as a sub-sector, 
requires analyzing and evaluating various information and data. In this stage, a quantitative model providing a 
first approach for the decision may be applied. The new institutional structure adopted in the sector during the 
1990s and 2000s brought about new conditions into an already complex decision process. In such context of 
methodology complexity,  political  aspects  gain  relevance,  becoming of  increased  importance.  The  political 
environment  is  described  and  the  players  are  identified.  One  conclusion  and  a  few  recommendations  are 
provided.
1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Countries must provide their populations with growing electrical power generation capacities, 
unless when their economies are undergoing a period of recession. However, Governments 
struggle to overcome recession periods, which, fortunately, do not last forever. According to 
the Brazilian electrical sector’s planning, the country would have to add generation capacities 
exceeding 3,000 MW per year,  for  a  reasonable period,  to  comply with the growth rates 
presented prior to the global economic crisis.  Decisions regarding nuclear energy are also 
based on this plan, which will be analyzed in the following pages.
Each  country  at  each  time  has  their  own  decision-making  criteria  to  evaluate  electricity 
generation  increase  options.  Some  criteria  considered  during  the  decision  process  are 
expressed by figures, though others may only be expressed in qualitative terms, turning the 
process subject  to subjective evaluations.  In articles,  the technical  performances of power 
generation options are mentioned as the most important  points  for the sector’s  expansion 
decisions; however, this is not the only aspect of relevance. Economic, environmental and 
social impact, as well as the impact on other public policies, must also be considered.
In the economic aspect, the generation of large blocks of electrical energy is restricted today 
and  in  the  near  future  to  a  few  technological  alternatives.  These  certainly  include 
hydroelectric  and  thermal  generation,  whether  by  using  natural  gas,  fuel  oil,  diesel  oil, 
sugarcane  bagasse,  mineral  coal  or  nuclear  fuel.  Some studies  include aeolian generation 
among  competitive  electricity  generation  alternatives.  Solar  and  tidal  generations,  for 
example, are still hopes for the future. Nuclear fusion will take long to prove technically and 
commercially viable.
Environmentalists claim that electrical energy must be preserved as the way to meet increased 
demand, as preserved energy is released to comply with new energy demands. However, this 
proposal  must  be  analyzed,  since  there  are  two  ways  to  preserve  electricity.  The  first 
comprises the manufacture of more energy-efficient equipment, machines and apparatus, the 
design  of  buildings  demanding  less  internal  lighting  and  refrigeration,  urban  planning 
preventing  against  the  construction  of  increasingly  taller  buildings  with  higher  needs  for 
elevators, water pumping, etc. These measures may be applied immediately, if they have not 
yet been, but have limited capacity for energy saving.
The second way requires a change in the behavior of the society and demand more time to 
bring  about  significant  effects.  It  comprises,  for  instance,  encouraging  migration  to  the 
countryside,  for  each  urban  resident  consumes  four  to  five  times  as  much  electricity  as 
countryside  resident.  In the same line,  environmentalists  blame society for  wasting,  since 
goods are  designed to  have  limited  lifetimes,  to  maximize  profit,  rather  than  to  preserve 
natural resources and minimize waste disposal. Such allegations are true, and we must start 
now to work for a more energy saving and less polluting society; however, this demands 
touching existing privileges. Therefore, the wasting model will remain for quite some time.
In the Brazilian case, there is an aspect affecting electrical power needs, which is the fact that 
energy  consumption  is  as  badly  distributed  in  the  society  as  income.  Therefore,  should 
income distribution improvements  hold,  they will  bring about  one more factor  increasing 
energy consumption, offsetting savings generated by preservation measures.
Investments  in  thermal  generation  plants,  including  nuclear,  tends  to  be  constant,  upon 
determination of the technology and generation capacity. On the other hand, investments in 
hydroelectric plants will be different for each hydraulic exploitation, due to different terrains, 
demanding  different  needs  for  dams,  as  well  as  distinct  river  flows  and  water  pressures 
demanding distinct projects. If we are going to compare generation units, under an economic 
point of view, it must be assumed that the alternatives will place the energy generated close to 
consumption centers, thus demanding the addition of complementary investments in energy 
transmission in the case of hydroelectric generation, since the remaining hydraulic potential is 
located far from such centers.
Furthermore,  the  useful  life  of  civil  works  and  equipment  of  the  different  generation 
alternatives are distinct. In thermal options, the future price of fuel, expected to grow above 
global  inflation  throughout  the  useful  life  of  the  plant,  will  influence  their  economic 
attractiveness.  In view of those factors,  technicians  claim that  the average cost  of energy 
generated and placed in a consumption center, throughout the useful life, should be used as 
term of comparison, once it encompasses all data. Actually, the calculation of such cost does 
encompass  most  data  regarding  each alternative,  though some,  such  as  the  possibility  of 
complying with the daily load curve, is left out.
The discussion regarding the competitiveness in generating large block of electrical energy 
often does not consider the cost of mitigation of or prevention against environmental damage, 
caused,  for example,  by emission of greenhouse gases,  sulfur and solid particles into the 
atmosphere, in the costs of the energy generated for comparison purposes. Should these costs 
be included, the competitiveness of thermal generation alternatives – except nucleoelectric – 
will be jeopardized. Thermal plants, when placed at tips of the electric system, increase its 
stability.
INAC 2009, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil.
The definitive  destination of waste  from nucleoelectric  generation is  beginning to have a 
solution in the world, through different proposals. Furthermore, there is the unfounded fear 
that  a  nucleolectric  plant  may have an accident  of  large  proportion,  even though such is 
proven to be unlikely. These plants were designed to work at the base of the electric system, 
with little capacity to follow the daily load curve.
Hydroelectric plants also have greenhouse gas emissions, though much less than fossil-fuel 
thermal plants. The nuclear plants emit no greenhouse gas. On the other hand, hydroelectric 
plants flood farmable areas or forests and require relocation of riverside population. In some 
cases,  they may flood villages,  roads and accesses to mineral  deposits  and archaeological 
sites. Like fossil-fuel thermal plants, they may follow daily load curves, with a number of 
turbines connected to generators exceeding the need for generation of firm energy, aiming at 
increasing supply during daily peak hours. This super-motorization of the plant generates a 
low capacity factor. The operation of an electric system with a predominantly hydroelectric 
base,  such as in Brazil,  with reservoirs  which may hold rain water  for over a year,  must 
consider the multiple use of water, the randomness of rainfall and the interference caused by 
the generation at one plant in generation plants downstream. To generate electricity today or 
to keep the water in the dam for generation tomorrow is not a simple decision and will be 
always present. 
Aeolian mills are blamed for killing birds, besides supplying intermittent energy, for wind 
speed is not constant. This is also the case of photovoltaic cells, which depend on sunlight. In 
short, there is not one-generation alternative that stands out as the best among all, since all are 
subject to some level of criticism by specialists.
The  criteria  to  evaluate  generation  technologies  may be  minimization  of  average  cost  of 
energy  generated,  maximization  of  local  acquisition  of  goods  and  services  during 
implementation, minimization of foreign fuel purchases during operation, maximization of the 
use of renewable sources, maximization of firm energy supply, capacity to follow daily load 
curves,  maximization  of  employment  generation,  minimization  of  environmental  impact, 
maximization of use of technology available in the country, maximum contribution for the 
stability of the electric system, possibility of geopolitical  and strategic attraction for other 
countries, etc.
With this initial information regarding technological options for generation and evaluation 
criteria, the adoption of each technology to expand the country’s generation capacity may be 
easily supported, upon enhancing the positive impacts of the technology chosen. A set of 
judgment criteria favoring the option desired will be implicitly chosen. This will facilitate the 
work of lobbyists and impair the work of the honest decision-maker.
Each country has an availability of reserves of generation potentials and an industrial park, 
with  a  given  technological  level.  Universities  and  research  centers  in  each  country  have 
different  capacity  levels  for  development  of  technology.  Countries  have  different  policies 
regarding the use of local manpower and different level of environmental concern, expressed 
in their legislations and in concrete actions against environmental abuse. In view of all that, 
there  is  no  optimal  choice  among  technological  options  to  supply  the  expansion  of  the 
generation capacity of any country.
In the Brazilian case,  there are abundant energy reserves or electric generation potentials. 
According to the 2007 National Energy Balance,  published by the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, the country held, as of 12/31/2006, 12.2 billion barrels of oil, 348 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas (both figures do not include the reserves of pré-sal), 70 GW firm of hydraulic 
energy remaining capacity, 309 thousand tones of Uranium, some portion of biomass energy 
(hard to assess, for sugarcane bagasse, the main biomass item for electricity generation, is 
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associated to the production of sugar and ethanol), and 32 billion tones of mineral coal, plus 
unaccounted aeolian potential.  Thus, the country will not suffer an electricity shortage for 
lack of generation sources.
The adoption by many countries  of the world of economic liberalism and the consequent 
deregulation of their economies, which also occurred in Brazil, as from the 1990s, brought 
about  institutional  changes in the role  of  the State in the expansion model  of the energy 
sector, i.e. the State ceased to determine the technologies to be used and the magnitude of 
such use, although it may still influence the choice through public bids and contracts to be 
signed. For such, the State would be constantly carrying out studies, aiming at ensuring such 
expansion is made in the interest of the society. However, it would be market agents who 
would build this new capacity to supply the expected growth in electricity demand.
Thus, the new role of the State consists, in many cases, of letting economic agents free to 
participate  in  bids  with different  technological  options.  Some of  these  bids  may turn out 
unsuccessful, requiring that the State take another direction towards expansion. However, it is 
said that the inconvenience of this new philosophy implemented is exactly letting the market 
perform the investments at its discretion, for it may occur that no agent takes interest in a 
given choice of interest to the society, that is, the capital logic will not necessarily arrive to 
the same recommendation as the social logic. In theory, the State should, in these cases, create 
new incentives for the production despised to turn it  into an attractive alternative for the 
market  or  invest  directly  in  the  production.  In  the  case  of  the  Jirau  and  Santo  Antônio 
hydroelectric  plants,  a  mixed  solution  was  adopted,  with  investments  made  by  a  State 
company and a private company together. It is worth noting that the sector comprises highly 
qualified  professionals,  but  who cannot  and,  maybe,  do  not  want  to  become involved in 
political matters in the sector.
Some specialists  advocate that decisions regarding the nuclear  power generation sector in 
Brazil  should remain in the hands of the State, which as per the law holds the monopoly 
existing since the beginning of the sector’s development, under the argument that this sub-
sector  requires  long-term  large  investments  and  introduces  some  technologies  with  high 
impacts on the country’s level of technological development. More specifically, the isotropic 
enrichment of Uranium has a high level of technological difficulty and is also a sensitive 
technology, for it may serve peaceful or belicist purposes, such as electricity generation or the 
development of a nuclear weapon.
When some scholars talk about the Brazilian State, there is the impression that this is the 
entity  controlling  the  Brazilian  Nation,  aiming  at  reaching  superior  targets  for  the 
development  of  our  society  towards  maximum  welfare  and  economic,  technological, 
environmental and social development. As a utopia, the Brazilian State may represent such 
desire,  though  the  sad  reality  is  an  entity  dominated  by  groups  of  interests,  especially 
domestic and foreign economic ones. The Brazilian society participates in elections, therefore 
expresses a partial opinion, though its potential wishes, those the society would have should 
the  questions  be  really  clarified,  and  even  its  conscious  desires,  are  not  transformed,  in 
numerous cases, into targets for the country, the State and the Nation. In given situations, the 
market does certainly impose alternatives a free Brazilian society would not adopt.
In Brazil, except for investments in uranium mining and in the construction and operation of 
nuclear  plants,  recently  requested  by  private  enterprises,  all  investments  in  nucleolectric 
generation were never asked for. Assuming emerging economic sectors, actual bottlenecks for 
development, as private investors do not feel attracted to take part in their development, has 
been the policy successfully adopted by the Brazilian Government between de 1940s and the 
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1970s, in order to promote the expansion of many sectors within the country’s infrastructure, 
such as oil, steelmaking, hydroelectric energy generation and telecommunications.
Recent  requests  by the private  enterprise  should generate  a  lot  of  discussion.  Doubts  are 
already arising, such as whether private uranium mining should be destined for exportation, 
since domestic needs are already supplied by state-controlled enterprises. By becoming an 
exporter of uranium with no beneficiation, would Brazil not be assuming the position of a 
country destined to the exportation of primary products, therefore a loser in the world market? 
Another doubt lies on the existing proposal  towards the existence of private nucleolectric 
plants, subsidiary of foreign groups, importing the fuel material necessary for their operation. 
Would Brazil,  with the 6th largest  uranium reserves in the world,  likely to ascend in this 
position,  import  beneficiated  uranium,  with  high  added  value?  Thus,  the  proposal  for 
nucleoelectric generation to stay out of the liberal opening of the economy, remaining in the 
hands of the State, is not unreasonable.
Another relevant factor for understanding the decisions taken regarding the nuclear sector is 
the fact that this is a sensitive technology,  as mentioned earlier,  which has a great global 
control apparatus aiming at its non-dissemination, including the International Atomic Energy 
Agency  (IAEA),  which  controls  nuclear  developments  in  countries  not  yet  holders  of 
technology,  basically  developing  countries,  as  well  as  the  use  of  nuclear  reactors  using 
technology imported by these countries.  Therefore,  there is  the world nuclear  geopolitics, 
exercised basically by countries having nuclear weapons, in the sense that nations not yet 
holding  this  technology  remain  so.  This  instrument  of  control  of  nuclear  technology 
dissemination also serves to create a market reserve regarding nuclear products for pacific 
purposes, estimated of being worth US$ 40 billion/year.
The change occurred in the activity of the State in the energy sector represents one more 
complicating factor for an already complex problem, though such change does not prevents 
against  the  continuance  of  the  line  of  research  regarding  the  sector’s  decision  process, 
especially because the State remains holding an inducing role. Since there is no technological 
option proving much superior to the others,  by using the judgment  criteria  described,  the 
concerns  towards  attracting  private  investments  and  as  investments  and  revenues  in  the 
expansion of the electric system represent huge figures, there are favorable conditions for the 
influence of political aspects in the decisions regarding expansion alternatives be increased. 
On the other hand, the political differential of the alternatives bears relevance in many of the 
public decisions occurred in various sectors where the State holds regulating power or is the 
producer itself.
2. POLITICAL ASPECTS IN THE DECISION PROCESS
In Brazil, the favorable political forces towards nucleoelectric expansion are domestic and 
foreign  manufacturers  of  equipment  for  nuclear  plants,  the  foreign  supplier  of  nuclear 
technology, plant construction companies, Brazilian military who see the adoption of nuclear 
generation  as  a  step  towards  the  construction  of  nuclear-powered  submarines,  the  group 
within Brazilian Diplomacy who sees as correct the conduction of a nuclear program with 
pacific purposes concerned with mastering the technology, the state apparatus in the sector, 
environmentalists who see the increased use of nuclear energy as a solution to reduce the 
emission of greenhouse gases, some scholars and businesses who intend to become suppliers 
of nuclear products, should the state monopoly in the sector come to an end.
The  forces  against  nuclear  energy  generation  include  civil  constructors  of  large  dams, 
domestic and foreign manufacturers of equipment for hydroelectric or thermal energy plants 
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(natural gas, fuel oil, etc), representatives of foreign Governments which do not wish Brazil to 
have  a  nuclear-powered  submarine,  the  part  of  the  country’s  Diplomacy  favorable  to  a 
position more closely attached to that of developed countries, foreign groups producers of 
goods and services for the nuclear industry who do not wish to see Brazil become a global 
supplier,  the  state  apparatus  of  hydraulic  or  thermal  (fossil-fueled)  generation, 
environmentalists who believe that increased nuclear generation would bring about increased 
chances of accidents, and some scholars.
It is worth noting that part of these groups of interest or political forces do not have financial 
motivations, whereas others have. The political forces mentioned are the groups of interest 
which, acting politically through claims and imposition, aim at obtaining benefits, whether by 
increased power, money or social benefits. At times, these forces seek political support among 
politicians in the office, though they are not the only holders of political power. These forces 
wish their positions to be accepted by the group of decision-makers, which sometimes, even 
for a decision as relevant as the expansion of the nuclear sector, does not involve a large 
number  of  people.  Furthermore,  the  reasons  behind  the  decisions  taken  are  not  always 
exposed in a transparent manner, and the documents supporting the decisions always regard 
technical argumentation, apparently logic, though not always impartial.
The accuracy of the process could be ensured by an informed society, which may occur only 
if such society has a satisfactory level of technical information and political awareness, as 
well  as with the existence of means of communication truly democratic  and interested in 
promoting  informative,  constructive  debate.  Anyway,  decision-makers,  whether  socially 
committed or not, seek not to confront the public opinion, should one exist, which may be a 
consequence of manipulation by groups of interest. On the other hand, decisions based on 
popular approval will be irrefutable in the short and midterms.
Thus,  those  bearing interest  in  a  given decision,  arrange the  publication  of  paid  articles, 
encourage  lectures,  congresses  with  carefully  chosen  specialists  presenting  opinions  of 
interest  to the sponsors,  in short,  our society is bombarded with camouflaged propaganda 
through  various  types  of  media.  As  the  ordinary  citizen  does  not  have  the  technical, 
economic,  environmental  (among  others)  knowledge  to  make  a  sound  judgment  of  the 
arguments, and the messages it receives are actual marketing pieces, this citizen becomes then 
an advocate of the decision which suits best its values, or refrains from taking a position.
It  is  worth  noting  that  these  various  lobbying  activities  are  not  unethical,  under  a  legal 
standpoint, for there is the understanding that, in advertising, one may omit the flaws of its 
own product. One may not provide untrue information regarding the positive aspects of it, nor 
regarding the negative aspects of third parties’ products.
Therefore,  the  complex  technical,  economic,  environmental  and  social  settings  of  the 
electricity  expansion  alternatives,  which  must  be  judged  under  relevant  criteria,  many  of 
which  may  not  be  quantified,  added  to  lobbyists’  activities,  to  the  lack  of  constructive, 
democratic  mass  communications,  and  to  the  governmental  decision-making  process 
inaccessible  to  the  ordinary citizen,  result  in  a  situation  where  a  rather  small  number  of 
decision-makers,  under  strong  influence  by  groups  of  interest,  defines  the  future  of  the 
Brazilian energy sector, and consequently, the country’s nuclear sector as well.
This  work  seeks,  exhaustively,  to  present  the  complexity  in  the  decisions  towards  the 
expansion of Brazil’s generating park, the social responsibility required by such decisions, the 
fierce  dispute  for  the  appropriation  of  the  sector’s  exceeding  output,  the  strong  interests 
involved in the decisions and, in the case of nuclear energy, the struggle for power through 
the possession of its technology. It is expected that the reader, from now on, recognize the 
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traps in articles with argumentation focused in a few points, clearly aiming at enhancing a 
given source of generation and with a restricted scope of analysis.
As  the  government  in  any country  will  be,  despite  the  popular  vote,  a  representation  of 
dominating political forces, which may not reflect the force of the people, the hypothesis of 
the government undertaking, in the Brazilian case, the task of straightening out this complex 
political issue does not exist. This is because Brazil’s weak representative democracy does not 
offer mechanisms for a judgment socially committed for proposals regarding infrastructure 
sectors, even when the proposal has a strong social impact. Only a highly conscious and well-
informed population, strongly claiming their rights, could offset the pressures by forces acting 
on decision-makers in the electrical and nuclear sector with particular interests.
This paper does not propose an authoritative alternative, not only for it may also be biased 
and do not necessarily improve the decision process, but also because it contributes for the 
increase of political unawareness of the society. The practice of successive elections, without 
suppressing  responsibility  and  the  people’s  right  to  present  their  claims  is  key  to  the 
development of political awareness in our society.
Despite these analysis are being presented now, they do not refer specifically to the present 
Government,  but to  all  Brazilian Governments of the last  40 years.  Besides this  fact,  we 
recognize that the nuclear decision is one of hundreds of relevant ones that Governments had 
to take.
3. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering that (i) the representatives of the people often do not act as such, (ii) details of 
the electrical and nuclear sector are normally not included in the programs of Presidential 
candidates, and also of candidates running for other positions, (iii) in the Brazilian culture, the 
programs  of  winning  candidates  do  not  necessarily  have  to  be  fulfilled,  (iv)  there  is  no 
tradition of frequent direct consultation to the society in relevant issues, (v) foreign, economic 
and power-related interests involved are considerable, (vi) the civil society does not have a 
significant number of entities overlooking decisions important to the society, (vii) there is no 
media unrelated to groups of capital, (viii) the strong dependence of government leaders on 
the economic power sponsoring their campaigns, and (ix) in the absence of hopes of fast 
awareness  of  the  society,  decision-makers  enjoy  full  freedom  to  follow  in  the  direction 
indicated by the most active forces. The less politically aware and conscious a population is, 
the easier it will be to approve programs of interest to the dominant political forces, with little 
importance given to the program’s merits or demerits.
Actions  could  be  proposed  to  improve  the  levels  of  education,  information  and  political 
awareness  of  the  people,  but  such  qualities  are  important  for  the  country  to  have  better 
citizens. Therefore, they would not acquire such characteristics only to be able to make better 
decisions regarding the electrical sector, though this would be a consequence. It is obvious 
that  our society needs to improve political  awareness,  and in this regard,  educational  and 
cultural development is necessary, though not enough. Exposition to political matters, their 
discussion and the improvement in perception through reading and lectures, schooling, etc. 
are the only antidotes against political alienation.
One recommendation, aiming at increasing the responsibility of the society in the decision-
making process, is the inclusion of aspects regarding the alternatives for electricity generation 
in secondary education (High School), possibly in Science classes. State organs in the energy 
sector should increase the number of public hearings – currently few and far from where the 
population  is,  for  these  often  provide  excellent  opportunities  of  discussion  between  State 
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representatives and the people. However, these hearings must be for the public in general or 
for  the segments  to  be affected  by the measures  at  issue.  They should not  be like  some 
hearings, so-called public, hold by Congress Commissions, where only representatives of the 
economic power get invited.
A Referendum is an option, but the execution is difficult,  for instance, there are so many 
issues to be addressed and so many judgment criteria that the people would have to answer, 
forming  a  considerable  number  of  questions.  It  is  not  guaranteed  either  that  pre-vote 
television campaigns would suffice to clarify such a complex subject.
Concluding, a better mass communication system will be necessary if we wish to have a more 
representative democracy in our country.  It is not possible to achieve a public discussion in 
the society if this discussion is promoted by groups of interest. 
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